education in economics at Yale and afterward studied in France and Germany. 1 Events during his investment banking career also shaped his view of the functioning of markets.
This paper examines how Meyer's economic philosophy led to the origin of federal financial rescues. First, the following section provides a brief biography of Eugene Meyer's professional career. Next, the thinking of his two influential teachers, Sumner and Wagner, are reviewed.
Then, his economic philosophy is presented. The rescue operations of the WFC and RFC are recounted, followed by a discussion of how Meyer might have viewed the responses to the 2007-2008 financial crisis. The final section concludes the paper.
II. EUGENE MEYER -PROFESSIONAL CAREER
Eugene Meyer amassed a sizable fortune in fifteen years as an investment banker/venture capitalist, and would accumulate much more as later investments reached fruition. Meyer's career began with a speculative gamble. Sensing that a McKinley victory in the 1900 election would spark a stock market rally, he used his financial capital of $5000 to purchase railroad stock options. By January 1901, his holdings were worth $50,000, and he used the entire sum to purchase a seat on the New York stock exchange, beginning his own investment banking firm (Meyer 1974, Box 179) . 2 Almost immediately, Meyer learned a strategy that would often profit him handsomely.
In a 1901 panic involving Northern Pacific Railroad stock, he began buying, for both himself and his customers, during the selling frenzy. Once the selling ended, Meyer and his clients were considerably enriched. 3 Meyer also anticipated the 1907 panic, liquidating assets early and buying into the worst of the decline, again reaping considerable profit.
In 1904, while on vacation, Meyer reflected on his investing successes and failures, and the influence of his studies in Germany altered his investing strategy. While in Berlin, Meyer had taken a course in "The Theory and Techniques of Statistics". Meyer decided to develop a new approach to investing by employing experts and analysts to conduct statistical and scientific analysis to relate the prospects of individual companies to economic trends, and he was the first on Wall Street to practice this now common method of security analysis. In 1909, Meyer's firm produced a famous report on the economic prospects of U. S. Steel. Impressed by the report, J.P.
Morgan warned a partner "watch out for that fellow Meyer, because if you don't he'll end up having all the money on Wall Street" (Merlo Pusey 1974, p.72) . Meyer was also known for his system of estimating freight car loadings to predict economic trends.
Meyer's financial strategy was to invest in new businesses essential to the growth of the economy. Feeling that the use of electric power and light would grow rapidly, but reluctant to invest in electric utilities, he focused on copper mining. His successes had by 1915 resulted in a personal fortune estimated to be between $40 and $60 million (Katharine Graham 1997, p. 24) . 4 Meyer realized that World War I would curtail shipment of German dyes to the United States, and he provided financing to a German chemist to develop a dye manufacturing company.
In 1916, this initiative led to the formation of the National Aniline and Chemical Company, and in 1921, Meyer negotiated a merger of this company with four other chemical companies to form Allied Chemical and Dye Corporation. By 1931, his stock in Allied Chemical added an additional $43 million to his net worth, and the continuous dividends during the depression covered his losses during his early years as publisher of the Washington Post (Graham 1997, p. 24) .
Early in his career he was interested in railroads, frequently investing in railroad stocks.
But by 1910, Meyer felt that the prospects for the railroads were declining, while those of automobiles were bright. This led to an investment in Maxwell Motors that while ultimately profitable, proved frustrating and placed him under rare financial pressure. But he also underwrote and invested heavily in the first stock offerings of an auto body company. Had he accepted stock rather than cash, he would have become one of General Motors' largest shareholders when GM purchased the Fisher Body Company that Meyer helped finance (Graham 1997, p. 20 Sumner's Forgotten Man is the middle class worker going about his life, working at his job, raising his family and enjoying the fruits of his labor.
However, the state may divert his "labor and self-denial…from his maintenance" (Sumner 1883, p. 15) to "The man who has done nothing to raise himself above poverty…" (Sumner 1883, p. 23) . To Sumner, this was the ultimate evil. The wealthy were the product of natural selection and helping the poor interfered with laissez-faire and thus was wrong.
Sumner objected to government intervention because the result was the worst of all monopolies the purpose of which was the exploitation of others (Sumner 1924, p. 227) . He believed that the German historical school was attracting a generation of American economist away from the truth (Robert C. Bannister 1973). 5 The German historical school favored an extensive welfare state that required a sacrifice of personal liberty (Sumner 1924, p. 268 The founders of the AEA intended that it be the American equivalent of the Verein promoting a similar progressive agenda (Benny Carlson 1999) . Ely said that the new association "must not include men of the Sumner type…" (quoted in Dorfman 1949, p. 206) . However, by 1887, the AEA altered its constitution, essentially eliminating its progressive agenda and focusing solely on research in an effort to attract young classically-trained economists as members Carlson ( Wagner's moral reasoning derived from his Christianity (Wolfgang Drechsler 1997).
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Wagner explained in his famous "Speech on the Social Question" that economics must ethically address social issues, stressing "the moral and therefore Christian obligations which wealth, education, and social position impose, even in dealing with the social question from the economic standpoint" (quoted in D. Wagner 1934, p. 489) .
While Sumner believed the distribution of income should be derived from natural selection, Wagner did not, and unlike Sumner, argued that "the redistribution of national income in favor of the lower classes is a conscious aim of modern social policy" (Wagner 1958, p. 9 Europe, even prior to the war, had as its policy faire marcher. 13 More than ever before Government and big business need to take council together" (Meyer 1974, Box 78) . Thus, Meyer, inspired by his exposure to Wagner's economic philosophy, arrived at the Progressive Era conclusion that the laissez-faire philosophy was outdated. He believed that "abnormal" conditions often controlled markets, and that men attempted to control and regulate markets for their own benefit (Meyer 1974, Box 180) . Meyer was no stranger to market instability. In 1910, while traveling in Asia and Europe with his new wife, Meyer received cables about a copper production and price war that was depressing the value of his investments. Meyer negotiated an "understanding" among the principal producers to cut production, ending the price war. The agreement was unwritten, leaving no evidence of explicit price fixing that would be construed as an antitrust violation (Pusey 1974, pp. 82-84) .
Before Meyer entered government service during World War I, he advised Bernard
Baruch, who was negotiating the purchase of 45 million pounds of copper for the armed services.
Baruch sought Meyer's advice regarding a "fair" price, and Meyer recommended a price based on a ten-year average that the copper producers accepted, even though it was significantly below the prevailing market price. This negotiated agreement earned both men considerable notoriety. He advocated the creation of a central purchasing agency to "regulate the whole industrial situation." In his position at the War Industry Board, Meyer sought to purchase metals at prices that he felt were "fair" (Pusey 1974, pp. 140 -148) .
Clearly Meyer believed that sizable price changes resulting from rapidly changing demand or supply could be "unfair". In such instances, Meyer felt action should be taken to "stabilize" markets. With his background as a very successful investment banker, his solution was the provision of credit or financing until markets returned to a more "normal" condition.
In an address about the WFC, Meyer advocated the federal provision of temporary financing of exports, claiming that the normal channels of export finance had broken down, and thus the WFC should make loans financing exports. In the same speech he advocated government intervention in the labor market. 15 He argued that waiting for supply and demand to clear the labor market took too long and entailed too much suffering. He argued that "that if you want to get the result quickly, and are unwilling to allow the difficulties and sufferings which exist in connection with unemployment, we must at times act with regard to the social aspects of the problem which the brutal application of the old law of supply and demand does not contemplate" (Meyer 1974 , Box 78).
Thus Meyer had abandoned the laissez-faire philosophy he had learned from Sumner at Yale for what he felt was a more pragmatic, interventionist approach to economic issues. He explained his change of thinking when discussing his proudest accomplishment in government service, the creation of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation:
If William Graham Sumner spoke for the laissez-faire theory of the nineteenth century into which I was born, the RFC was the dramatic symbol of the opposite theory. It represented the need for far-reaching governmental intervention in the functioning of the private enterprise system -a system which had undergone a cataclysmic cycle of boom and bust. (Meyer 1954, p. 22) .
In sum, while never characterized as such, Meyer was a Republican progressive, in the vein of President Theodore Roosevelt whom Meyer admired: "I was in fact a very great admirer of Theodore Roosevelt…" (Meyer 1961, p. 64 ). Meyer espoused many of the progressive ideals of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. 16 He rejected laissez-faire and classical liberalism. He embraced measurement and an empirical/scientific approach in all that he did.
His emphasis on the importance of "administration" is similar to the progressive embrace of Taylor's scientific management. 17 And as described below, he advocated a larger role for central government, contrary to Sumner's laissez-faire philosophy.
While the progressive movement in his own country undoubtedly influenced Meyer, his time in Germany was also important. Meyer's French father had instilled in his son an antiGerman hostility. But his time in Berlin evoked a change in attitude: "But now that Eugene Jr.
was in Berlin, his anti-German prejudices began to ebb… Meyer fell easily into the cadence of a true Berliner. The air over-head--as he first breathed it -seemed so free, so liberal, so progressive" (Meyer 1974, Box 179) . His time in Germany had a profound influence on Meyer's economic philosophy.
VI. THE WAR FINANCE CORPORATION
Scant attention has been paid to the activities of the War Finance Corporation or their significance. Saulnier et al. (1958, p. 192) do note that WFC lending in 1921-22 was "A significant extension of the scope of government activity in the farm credit field…" In actuality, WFC lending was even more significant, as the loans were made directly to banks and other financial institutions that were under pressure due to the agricultural depression. Rescuing the farmers required rescuing the bankers. The WFC began operations on May 20, 1918 . In addition to recommending on private borrowings, 18 the WFC was to provide funding to industries essential to the war effort. The WFC received capital of $500 million from the U.S. Treasury. The legislation authorized the WFC to borrow up to an additional $3,000 million through bond issues. The WFC was an offbudget agency, not requiring annual appropriations. The original legislation required the WFC to close six months after the end of the war; however, its existence was extended several times.
Another provision of the act authorized the WFC to deal in government bonds. The Treasury delegated to the WFC the responsibility to purchase Liberty and subsequently Victory bonds to limit fluctuations in the market price of these bonds, as their prices had fallen sharply after they were issued, resulting in many complaints. The intention of the repurchases was to stabilize prices in the hope that stable prices would facilitate subsequent bond issues without increasing the coupon rate.
The WFC did engage in significant bond purchases. Between its bond issues, the Treasury bridged its financing needs, including WFC bond repurchases, through sales of short-term certificates of indebtedness. The endeavor was profitable due to the significant discount at which the bonds sold during the buy-back period. The WFC purchases, while not returning prices to par, appear to have had some stabilizing impact, as bond prices dropped sharply when the purchases ended.
19 Figure 1 depicts the yields to maturity on the Third and Fourth Liberty Bonds that comprised the majority of WFC purchases, and the coupon rate on Treasury certificates of indebtedness.
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The higher yields on the war bonds until mid-1920 made the purchases profitable, as well as possibly keeping the yields on subsequent issues lower than they would otherwise have been.
Meyer recalls that in 1920 Assistant Treasury Secretary Russell Leffingwell "was finding difficulty in selling ninety-day treasury bills (sic) at six percent" (Meyer 1961, p. 335) . It was at this time that the bond purchase program was terminated. Houston's deflationary polices, expressing his belief in the benefit of federal intervention: "that the Corporation -if it had continued to function -would have been able to mitigate, to some degree at least, the suddenness and extent of the collapse in commodity markets and prices in the fall of 1920…" (Meyer 1923, p. 83 ).
But while Meyer had resigned, he had not retired from promoting continued WFC lending. He began a propaganda campaign seeking a revival of the WFC. At the New York Chamber of Commerce he advocated continued federal provision of credit: "…we face an emergency in which private credits will not of their own accord be forthcoming to finance foreign trade. The government alone is in a position to bolster and again set in motion the normal operations of the international credit mechanism…" (Meyer 1974, Box 180 to financing exports, the WFC's activities expanded to include lending to rural banks and cooperatives. It was this version of the WFC that later was his model for the RFC.
As a result of the 1921 Agricultural Credits Act, much of the WFC's lending went to banks.
The objective of the lending program was to assist banks and co-ops in agricultural regions.
WFC loans provided banks with liquidity and the ability to repay loans to their correspondents, hopefully making the banks were more willing to carry farm loans than to call them, and to make With the creation of the Federal Intermediate Credit Banks to provide agricultural financing on a permanent basis, Meyer felt the WFC was no longer needed, and worked to close the agency. 22 In January 1925 he returned $499 million of WFC capital to the Treasury, and resigned from the WFC. 23 A small amount of direct lending continued through 1928, after which the WFC continued to collect on its outstanding loans until it was closed in 1939.
WFC loans to industries essential to the war never approached the anticipated amount, as the war ended six months after WFC initiated its operations. 24 WFC purchases of Treasury bonds were sizable, but ultimately were financed by Treasury sales of short-term debt that financed the repurchase of the war bonds. Rather than the volume of its lending, the significance of the WFC was the precedent it set for federal intervention into credit markets.
VII. THE RECONSTRUCTION FINANCE CORPORATION
Research on the RFC has generally focused on the effectiveness of RFC policies. James
Butkiewicz ( (2003) finds that RFC loans failed to help troubled railroads. Butkiewicz (1999) and Richard H. Gene Smiley (1988, 1993) investigate whether publicizing the identity of banks receiving RFC loans contributed to the 1933 financial crisis. Mason (2003) finds that RFC loans were not directed to localities to reap political benefit. Less is made of the fact that Eugene Meyer's RFC resulted in a vast expansion of federal intervention into the economy. The Reconstruction Finance Corporation legislation was passed on January 22, 1932. Like the WFC, the RFC was initially capitalized by the U. S. Treasury at $500 million, and could issue bonds to the public or the Treasury to raise an additional $1.5 billion. The RFC's original powers authorized lending to banks and other financial institutions, railroads, and for crop loans. Total RFC lending in 1932 was $1.5 billion (Saulnier et al., p. 381) . Subsequent amendments vastly expanded the scale and scope of RFC lending authority.
Meyer viewed the RFC as supplementing and extending Federal Reserve lending authority, including making loans on low-quality assets that the Fed could not rediscount:
I had to get the RFC to supplement the federal reserve with powers that the federal reserve didn't have and couldn't, wouldn't, and shouldn't have, such as making loans on slow assets. They [the Fed] had a currency responsibility. The RFC was there to take the slow assets the federal reserve couldn't take. … The quick assets there wasn't any trouble about.
They [banks] could go to the federal reserve bank. The trouble was they didn't have enough of that kind of asset to meet the demands of the depositors by loans from the federal reserve bank or rediscounts, because of the sums being withdrawn. …. I got up the RFC to save the federal reserve system, to do the things that we couldn't do in the federal reserve.
I used all the machinery of the federal reserve -the personnel -to get it into action fast! (Meyer 1961, pp. 679 -681 [1929] [1930] [1931] [1932] [1933] Great Contraction was preceded by speculation in both stocks and real estate and that "…real estate speculation was perhaps worse than the stock market speculation had been, though less spectacular" (Meyer 1974 , Box 181).
As noted above, Meyer believed that unemployment was wasteful and that reducing unemployment should not be left to the market if alternative policies would reduce it faster. He would not have wanted the crisis to devolve into a depression.
Meyer was not wedded to the status quo. He believed that economics was an art and that its application evolved over time. Late in life he reflected on the legislation of securities market regulations as a necessary response to the speculation that preceded the Great Contraction, observing: "You never could have passed a federal law at that time dealing with the supervision of bonds, stocks, flotation of companies publicly under any federal authority, just because they hadn't gotten around to thinking of those problems as national problems in the sense that the depression made clear as necessary" (Meyer 1961, p. 542 (Meyer 1974, Box 179) .
Applying his pragmatic approach to economics, Meyer believed that markets function well under "normal" conditions, but that the "abnormal conditions" following the war created economic instability that could be remedied only through government intervention (Meyer 1974, Box 180) . Thus, he became the foremost proponent of federal government financial intervention to stabilize markets during periods of economic difficulty.
His first duties during the war included purchasing essential commodities for the war effort.
Frequently he would refuse to make purchases at the prevailing market price. In these instances, he typically sought to negotiate a price he considered to be "fair".
His responsibilities at the War Finance Corporation included buying Liberty and Victory bonds to stabilize price fluctuations. Later, he was able to convert the WFC into an export and then agricultural credit agency. His objective was to stabilize markets, hopefully reversing some of the deflation that had depressed prices of agricultural products, thereby providing relief to distressed farmers. WFC lending in 1921-22 was the first federal bank rescue operation.
During the contraction phase of the Great Depression, Meyer again felt the need for a federal financial rescue, ultimately convincing President Hoover of the need for a federal financial agency, the Reconstruction Finance Corporation. Under Meyer, the RFC primarily lent money to provide liquidity to the distressed banking sector, while RFC activities greatly increased during the New Deal and Second World War.
Meyer understood that the RFC was the direct opposite of laissez-faire philosophy he had learned in college. He concluded that "abnormal" circumstances justified government intervention. However, he also felt that such intervention should be temporary, and should be terminated when conditions returned to "normal" (Meyer 1954, p. 27) .
But the door that Meyer opened with the WFC and RFC was never closed. During FDR's presidency, the off-budget borrowing and lending powers of the RFC afforded numerous opportunities for federal intervention into the allocation of credit and the resulting resource allocation of the economy. Federal intervention in the allocation of credit and financial rescues have continued to the present, much of it through the descendants of the RFC, including the Commodity Credit Corporation, the Export-Import Bank, Fannie Mae and the Small Business Administration.
Whether, or when, federal intervention into credit markets and the U.S. economy would likely have occurred had Eugene Meyer never held a government position is a matter of speculation. Meyer opened the door, and FDR, following him, plowed a much wider path.
Almost single-handedly, Eugene Meyer paved the way for a revolution of federal financial rescues in the American economy. For better or worse, this is his legacy.
